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Abstract: My research analyzes police reformations that occurred during Reconstruction in the 
aftermath of the Civil War. In my paper, I focus on the development of post-war police 
departments in three cities: New York, New Orleans, and Chicago. My argument covers the 
period spanning from the end of the Civil War in 1865 to the end of Reconstruction around 1880. 
My thesis argues that modern police reformation has been made intensely difficult as a result of 
the societal and economic role police had before and during Reconstruction. I argue that 
militarization of police departments across the country arose from the need to stop labor unrest 
and control minority groups. The systemic racism attributed to modern day police violence is not 
only a biproduct of the United States’ racist history, it is also a major symptom of the failure of 
Reconstruction. The ten pages I would like to contribute to the conference will focus on the 
development of New Orleans’ police force during Reconstruction and point to evidence that 
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Whether the state is an apparatus for the public to regulate itself in or the state imposes its 
own will on the people, the fundamental purpose of law is to ensure the stable and safe function 
of every societal sphere, public and private. Modern societies facilitate this most obviously with 
large, heavily coordinated policing agencies designed ideally to address specific disorders, 
violent, civil, financial, or otherwise. 
Public order in ancient societies was typically without the existence of police 
organizations as they are understood in today’s settings. Mainly, this is because terms such as 
“policing” and “law enforcement” are laden with modern connotations and are accordingly 
dismissed as anachronism. The Oxford Classical Dictionary, for instance, in its definition of 
police, explains that “They are a creation of the 18th and 19th cents., and reflect the growth of 
state power in the increasingly complex and bureaucratic societies of the modern industrialized 
world.”1 Due to technological constraints limiting efficient centralization, or simply because the 
idea never occurred to them, most ancient states never developed the infrastructure necessary to 
support police as they are understood today. Accordingly, a distinction must be made between 
law enforcement as an activity and as a specific agency which is granted a monopoly on force. 
Because of this, “policing,” “law enforcement,” and their synonyms should be utilized as verbs 
more so than nouns, with responsible individuals and groups referred to specifically.  
A popular theory for how the Romans—and other ancient societies—successfully 
maintained public order is that of community self-regulation. Defined by Christopher Fuhrmann 
as redress for crimes without the involvement of state institutions, this phenomenon was present 
in all eras of Roman legal history from the creation of the Twelve Tables to the compiling of the 
Justinian Digest (450 BCE to CE 530).2 Forms of self-regulation varied considerably, 
encompassing a large range of personal habits, organizations, and social pressures. 
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For example, self-defense was legal in Rome, up to and including the killing of burglars 
at night and armed intruders by day.3 Citizens were required to shout in order to attract witnesses 
in the event of theft, regardless of the thief’s survival.4 Beyond the household, they were 
permitted to carry weapons while abroad; traveling alone was ill-advised, and most citizens 
avoided doing so whenever possible.5 Loosely organized bands would regularly form in response 
to epidemics of banditry, in line with the general state sanction of self-defense.6 
Private security was the norm for those who could afford it. Guards and other watchmen 
were common at estates, especially in the form of slaves.7 Patrons, with immense entourages of 
clients and slaves, were naturally insulated from violence by an envelope of favorable parties. 
Such defensive crowds may have meaningfully delayed the development of more robust public 
security organizations, as they satisfied that function efficiently and without arduous taxes.  
Aside from offices and titles, the other primary argument against institutional policing in 
Rome is the level of local autonomy afforded the provinces. Romans had a well-established 
tradition of adopting local institutions and customs from the territories that they conquered. 
Many Greek cities, for instance, being largely developed before the advent of Roman hegemony, 
continued to employ popular assemblies after the implementation of Roman rule.8 Cities fell 
under varying statuses, with each status entailing different levels of direct or indirect state 
intervention, such as taxes or an expanded military presence or different forms of rights.9 The 
highest ranked cities were allowed to continue their pre-existing customs with complete 
autonomy.10 Conversely, as in the case of Macedonia, states were “dismembered” and their 
governments were forcibly stitched into the best approximation of the Roman model that could 
be achieved, primarily by the installment of sympathetic elites.11 
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Rome was not unique in its use of community self-regulation. Both the Republic and the 
Empire employed it to varying degrees throughout the extent of their territory. Even as the 
Empire developed more centralized interventions into public order, community self-regulation 
never disappeared; the two co-existed, with self-regulation discarded or co-opted in response to 
an emperor’s pressing needs, in line with Fergus Millar’s model of imperial passivity.12 
Concurrent with these republican ventures in centralized law enforcement were the 
traditions of Ancient Egypt. The papyrus archive demonstrates a history of institutional law 
enforcement extending back all the way to the Old Kingdom (2600–2150 BCE). Continuity 
cannot be established between the various dynasties of Egypt and their law enforcement 
institutions. Instead, it is better to categorize these traditions into various periods of 
experimentation.13 Ptolemaic Egypt (323–30 BCE) is the most relevant since it was during this 
period that the Romans successfully invaded. 
Ptolemaic Egypt was quite anomalous in just how centralized its policing efforts were.14 
The foremost agents of Ptolemaic law enforcement were the phylakitai.15 Fairly autonomous, 
their responsibilities were broad, encompassing many tasks associated with modern police 
forces. Phylakitai arrested criminals and transferred them either to prisons called desmōtērion 
(complete with their own officials called desmophylakes) or to trials. Additionally, they could be 
charged with criminal investigations, examining and seizing evidence, witnesses, and suspects as 
necessary. Regularly, phylakitai provided armed security, for example in crop fields or on ships, 
where they would temporarily be rebranded epiploi (“men on board ship”). Other responsibilities 
included grain distribution, tax collection, government postal service, or even petty errand 
running (whenever assigned as “gofers”).16 
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Even the lowest classes in Egypt had access to the services of the phylakitai through the 
act of petitioning. Surprisingly accessible and efficient, the petition process granted the general 
population an opportunity to redress many misdeeds and grievances, including violence, 
harassment, contractual disputes, and local governmental corruption. Officials at all levels of the 
law enforcement hierarchy were charged with receiving and acting upon petitions, even those 
who were not primarily concerned with criminal justice. Petitioning to higher, more 
administrative positions, such as the epistatai or the stratēgoi, was meant to check possible 
malfeasance by the phylakitai.17 
Although the phylakitai were primarily composed of both Egyptians and Greeks, no 
evidence of any kind exists for centralized policing efforts in Egypt’s Greek population centers: 
Alexandria, Naukratis, and Ptolemais Hermiou. It is possible that the Greeks imported their 
traditions of community self-regulation from their motherland, although this remains uncertain.18 
The absence of centralized efforts at maintaining public order in these areas may have had 
significant influence over the severity of the later Jewish diaspora revolts in CE 116–117. 
Ptolemaic Egypt was highly unusual in its use of centralized law enforcement methods, 
but they were remarkably effective for their time and circumstances. It was one of many aspects 
that made Egypt distinctive in the Roman Empire, and there should be no doubt that the Romans 
were inspired by Egypt in the policies that they would enact elsewhere. Many offices and 
institutions of centralized law enforcement later present across the Empire had their precedents 
in Ptolemaic Egypt. If the Egyptians did not create these offices themselves, they originated from 
the Romans’ intrusions and modifications of the Egyptian system, especially those on the 
emperor’s part. Egypt came to occupy a unique place within the Roman Empire. Its well-
established heritage—both indigenous Egyptian and Greek—made it particularly sensitive to 
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potential rebellion. Egypt’s heart, the profoundly fertile farmland along the Nile, gave Egypt 
paramount economic status as one of the principal contributors to Rome’s public grain 
subsidies.19 Writers of the imperial period also portray Egypt immediately after annexation, with 
emphasis usually on Alexandria, as “torn and tossed by fanaticism and sedition, ignorant of law, 
unused to bureaucratic government”: a degenerated place with its glory eviscerated 
everywhere.20 
Augustus, in all probability, shared this low view of Egypt with the ancient historians, so 
he implemented special measures to curtail these perceived trends toward anarchy. Strabo noted 
that three entire legions were permanently deployed to Egypt, two for the countryside and one 
for Alexandria alone. Nine additional cohorts supplemented the legions, in conjunction with 
three cavalry groups. Later years would see these forces utilized to quell violence in Alexandria, 
such as CE 66 with reinforcements from Libya. Claudius would issue an ambiguous but 
threatening ultimatum against the Alexandrians early in his reign; doubtless, this would have 
involved violent repression by the legions in the worst-case scenario.21 Overall, efforts to 
centralize public order were initially gradual in Egypt. This process would accelerate, however, 
with the advent of the Jewish diaspora revolts. 
Ptolemaic Egypt was primarily divided into ethnic Egyptians, a powerful Greek minority 
nonetheless declining, and Jews, whose history of persecution under the Romans is very 
extensive. These groups were not particularly fond of each other, especially in Greek population 
centers such as Alexandria, and Greek revulsion of Jews is attested to in papyri. Whatever 
economic prosperity the Jews had managed to achieve abruptly evaporated with Roman 
annexation. Mismanagement of former Ptolemaic lands resulted in many Jewish tenant farmers 
being impoverished. Ptolemaic Jews became subject to the Fiscus Judaicus and the laographia 
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for the first time, which were particularly draining on lower-class families and an affront to the 
more affluent Jews. Caligula began the first Jewish pogrom in history at Alexandria in CE 38. 
Jewish political rights throughout the Roman Empire continually receded from that point 
onward.22 
Although it was years in the making, the Jewish diaspora revolt was swift in its 
catastrophe. Farms were razed, temples were toppled, and frequent riots normalized mass 
murder. Roman forces proved inadequate for suppressing the violence, incurring heavy losses 
throughout the ordeal. Collapse of public order was resolute, even more extreme than the 
disarray at the end of the civil wars, and the Romans were initially helpless to resurrect it. 
Clearly—so the Romans believed—profound changes to Egypt’s law enforcement institutions 
were vital if similar implosions were to be avoided in the future.23 
Perhaps the most significant change to Egyptian law enforcement that Rome enacted was 
a substantial increase in the number of conscripted guard posts to supplement the existing 
phylakitai. The list is exhaustive, including field guards, threshing floor guards, sluice guards, 
crop guards, prison guards, day guards, night guards, harbor guards, river guards, and 
watchtower guards.24 Over a fifth of all known mandatory civil services involved security in 
some form or another.25 
Night watchmen, otherwise known as nyktophylakitai, came to proliferate in Egypt 
during the revolt. It is possible that they served day and night shifts simultaneously.26 They were 
strictly regimented, between one and twenty per town, with specific patrol routes assigned to 
each of them. Additionally, they would issue summonses and bring defendants to court. 
Complaints exist from nyktophylakitai about having to perform patrols and produce summonses 
without additional assistance. Being so centralized made it significantly easier for the Roman 
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prefect and the emperor to bypass jurisdictional boundaries and assert their will, such as through 
the distribution of wanted lists.27 
Being a very alien environment to the Romans, Egypt elicited unique policies from them 
in the realm of public order. Profound change was also occurring in Rome with the death of the 
Republic. Annexing Egypt gave Emperor Augustus and his chief subordinates an incredibly 
convenient excuse to experiment with new ways of enforcing their ideal public order. Several 
fundamental policies of the later emperors would descend from this experimentation in 
Ptolemaic Egypt. 
Despite Augustus’ claims to the contrary, the emperor’s power was ultimately founded 
on the subversion of gubernatorial and senatorial institutions. Senators were not allowed to 
become the prefect of Egypt, or even permitted entry into Egypt at all. Seeing Egypt’s well-
established heritage and economic vitality, Augustus was quite overt in this effort to prevent a 
senatorial dissident movement from acquiring valuable resources.28 
Emperors never established a body that could technically be called a secret service or a 
secret police force, although they delegated similar functions to favored soldiers. Caligula once 
sent a squad of soldiers to assassinate the governor of Egypt by surreptitiously infiltrating one of 
his dinner parties disguised as servants. Vespasian’s ally Mucianus sent a centurion to falsify 
charges against the proconsul of Africa, Lucius Piso, and then execute him. The centurion in 
question had performed at least one other instance of similar work, that being the assassination of 
Clodius Macer under Galba.29 
The one organization with the closest resemblance to a secret police or intelligence 
service would be the notorious frumentarii. Reportedly, Hadrian employed them as spies against 
his household and friends. Gallineus learned of Claudius II’s revulsion for him through the 
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surveillance of frumentarii. Macrinius used a single frumentarius to investigate sexual 
misconduct among the soldiery. Frumentarii were used to murder an ardent critic of Commodus, 
one Saoterus, on the orders of the praetorian prefect Paternus.30 
Before their days as the emperor’s personal spies and hitmen, however, the frumentarii 
were possibly grain distributors charged with sustaining the food supply of military bases. The 
earliest references to the frumentarii on record date to the second century CE, well after the 
annexation of Egypt.31 It is possible that they were formed to manage the newfound grain supply 
from Egypt, and the emperor only made them his special force after they had conveniently 
developed a vast material and information network across Rome. 
Moreover, surveillance and assassination were only small aspects of the frumentarii’s 
duties, the majority of which were considerably more mundane. Usually, they served as the 
emperor’s personal messengers, bearing his decrees to provincial governors and returning with 
status reports. Frumentarii also assisted stationarii as tax collectors and occasional patrolmen. 
Official petitions, often complaints against their excessive requisitions, are the primary source 
for their duties. All of these are reminiscent of the elder phylakitai in Egypt, so much so that it 
can be argued that the frumentarii were modeled after them. None of these functions disappeared 
when Diocletian abolished them, either. A new organization, the agentes in rebus, assumed 
many of the frumentarii’s former assignments.32 
Suetonius writes that toward the end of the civil wars “Bands of robbers showed 
themselves openly, completely armed, under colour of self-defence, and… travellers, freemen 
and slaves without distinction, were forcibly carried off.” Appian concurs, writing that “At this 
time Italy and Rome itself were openly infested with bands of robbers, whose doings were more 
like barefaced plunder than secret theft.” Both historians also describe very centralized military 
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responses by Augustus in order to curtail this violent mess: Suetonius the “establishing [of] posts 
of soldiers in suitable stations for the purpose,” and Appian “the custom and system of cohorts of 
night watchmen still in force” in the middle second century CE.33 
Appian was probably referring to the use of vigiles as watchmen beginning in CE 6. 
Originally formed as firefighters, their responsibilities evolved to include night patrols and 
combating petty crime. They resembled the phylakitai in that they were appointed from freedmen 
and commanded by a centralized military organization, in this case city prefects.34 Appian’s 
description of the vigiles foreshadows the much larger development that Suetonius covers, which 
is the emergence of what can be called detached soldier-police or stationarii. 
Stationarii can be best defined as soldiers detached or diverted from their legions in order 
to maintain public order in any given area of Imperial Rome; this is very similar to the role of the 
phylakitai. Egypt, in fact, contains the earliest references to them in the form of ostraka travel 
passes, dated between CE 108 and 117.35 Within Egypt specifically, they would come to share 
the power to receive and respond to petitions alongside the phylakitai, bypassing the 
gubernatorial administration entirely.36 
The ostraka demonstrate that stationarii were used to regulate movement throughout the 
Empire. Heavy traffic was a prevailing factor in the emperor’s detaching of legions to an area, as 
it usually correlated with economic interests. Greater traffic attracted banditry, especially along 
trade routes. Mines were regularly guarded by stationarii. They were frequently expected to 
enforce popular morals, as evidenced by their use in the persecution of Christians and hunting 
fugitive slaves. Stationarii also served as tax collectors.37 Once again, these functions are 
identical to those of the phylakitai in Ptolemaic Egypt, and they were only practiced elsewhere in 
the Empire after Egypt’s annexation. 
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Regionarii were similar to stationarii in their mission, except that they were centurions 
who occupied more administrative tasks, ranging from duty rosters to the arrangement of 
watchtowers. Much as in the Thebaid, civilians were impressed into service in order to man these 
watchtowers, with regionarii as their superior officers. Stationarii could be ordered by them to 
assist in investigations by detaining suspects for questioning.38 Ultimately, regionarii could be 
compared to the archiphylakitai, or one of the many other Egyptian law enforcement positions 
with identical administrative powers. 
Roman emperors gradually devised novel ways of imposing their will on the general 
population of the Empire. Almost all of these involved direct use of the military to circumvent 
established republican institutions, especially in the maintenance of public order. Even though 
the emperor’s efforts at policing the behavior of his people do not qualify as modern police 
agencies, nevertheless, they were centralized and relatively standardized in their organization 
and conduct. They were clearly designed with the purpose of enforcing the whims of Rome’s 
leading citizen as law. Ptolemaic Egypt was annexed in conjunction with the founding of the 
principate. This gave the young office a chance to test novel applications of its power in a place 
that many believed needed special measures to control. Various institutions and practices that the 
emperors established bear incredible resemblance to those already existing in Egypt, or to those 
that Augustus immediately created to cope with Egypt’s unique social and environmental 
conditions. Accordingly, when discussing the powers of the emperor, Egypt should be regarded 
as one of their principal sources.
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